我的原则是一切以文本为基础，所有定义出自The Gender Controversy（Mikkola），The metaphsics Of Gender（Witt）两篇论文。所以这可能不是真正的定义，只是她们认为的定义。如果报道出现了偏差，希望谅解。
描述性:Biological sex traits are thought to pervade every aspect of an individual, down to their social position and intellectual capacities.
规范性:Biological sex traits provide general frame-works for social and political arrangements along gendered lines.
2.gender construction:Ding说很难准确的定义社会构建论，它的含义仅仅是biological determinism描述性定义的否定。mikkola把它分为两种。
(1)causal construction: social forces either have a causal role in bringing gendered individuals into existence, or they (to some substantial sense) shape the way we are qua women and men.
(2)discursive construction:we are gendered the way we are, at least to a substantial extent, because of what is attributed to us by others.
“However, I will largely avoid this common terminology since feminist usage of the term ‘essentialism’ varies tremendously.”
Some feminist discussions equate essentialism with biologism.
(2)essentialism等同于kind essentialism/gender realism
Those who would advocate gender essentialism understood as kind essentialism mistake what is social and variable for what is natural and fixed.
注:mikkola认为kind essentialism即gender realism。
I will use “gender realism” to capture the position of classificatory essential-ism.
(3)essentialism分为kind essentialism和individual essentialism
They are conceptually independent of one another because they address distinct philosophical questions.
what makes an individual be the individual that it is？
what is the basis for these groupings?
Aristotle differentiated between men and women (the male and the female) because of their different reproductive functions, but he did not think that either men or women were individuals because of their reproductive functions. Rather, he thought that both men and women were constituted as individuals by virtue of the presence of human soul (conceived of functionally) to their bodies. The human soul (conceived of functionally) is uniessential to both individual men and individual women; but men (as a kind) are defined in terms of the male reproductive function and women (as a kind) are defined in terms of the female reproductive function.
她根据对上述问题“What makes an individual be the individual that it is？”的不同回答，又把individual essentialism分为unification essentialism 和identity essentialsm。
The question—What makes an individual the individual it is?一can be understood in at least two ways, and the two interpretations yield slightly different theories of individual essentialism.
And the answer is that they realize the functional property that defines being a house, which is to shelter humans and animals. Being a shelter for humans and animals is what makes these materials a house rather than a heap of stuff or a sum of parts.
One answer is that it must be made from the very materials from which it, in fact, originated.If it had originated from a different piece of wood then it would not be this very lectern. Its origins are a necessary property of the lectern.
uniessentialism is a theory about the ontological constitution of unified individuals, and it applies to any unified individual that is made up of parts, including artifacts, organisms, persons, agents, plays, God, and so on.
It is important to be clear that the question of why a sum of parts makes up a new individual is not a causal question. To use Aristotle’s idiolect, it is important to distinguish between the cause of being (ontological question) and the cause of becoming (causal question).
Functional properties are relational rather than intrinsic properties.
The unity of social agents is not a relationship among material parts; it is a relationship of normative unity among our various social position occupancies.
And finally, functional properties have a normative dimension because the function specifies what that object ought to do, and not simply what it does.
A house with a leaky roof is a house, even if it is defective in relation to its essential task of providing shelter. Because functional properties are normative, it is possible for an individual to have a function that it cannot or does not perform.
At the first level, an individual can be judged as performing its function well or badly; and the function itself provides the norm of judgment.
However, at a second level we can evaluate the function itself, in terms of ethical, political, or religious norms, for example.
For convenience I refer to KripkeS essentialism as identity essentialism, because it uses our intuitions concerning the identity of individuals to determine what their essential properties are.
It is important to see that Kripke is not asking us to imagine what changes an artifact like the lectern could undergo and still persist. Rather than thinking temporally about change, we are to think modally, about possibility and necessity.
Identity essentialism is intimately connected with modality; an individual’s essential properties are its necessary properties.
a.properties of origin
c.properties of substance
Kripke classifies the necessary properties of individuals into three sorts: properties of origin (a material object must come from the very hunk of matter it did come from), sortal properties (being a lectern is a necessary property of a lectern), properties of substance (a material object must be made from the kind of matter it is in fact made from).