4.gender realism:metaphysical realists about properties hold that individual entities of a certain sort share a universal feature that makes them entities of that sort.(定义来自mikkola,mikkola和witt都认为gender realism即kind essentialism)
Realism” about a property has often been the claim that the property exists in the physical, or natural, world. Color realism, for example, is the claim that there is some physical property that constitutes what it is to be scarlet, or ochre, or pea green.
There is a notion of gender realism that is parallel to realism in the first sense: being a woman is a natural, or biological, intrinsic property of an individual.
The argument from social construction claims that when we deny gender realism in the first sense.
There is a notion of gender realism that is parallel to realism in the first sense: being a woman is a natural, or biological, intrinsic property of an individual. As a result of this view, women were taken to be females who have (in virtue of being female) certain natural aptitudes, such as those for nurturing or intuitive reasoning, and normative corollaries about women’s different or inferior social status were thought to be legitimate.
witt把认为realism仅仅是这种意义上的人称作the social construction argument against gender essentialism.
In other words, they reject gender realism. Since women (and men) form social kinds or groups, not natural kinds, their membership cannot be defined by a shared property. This argument assumes that only membership in natural kinds (like biological species) could be defined by a common property because only natural kinds are stable and homogenous. In contrast, the features that characterize women (and men) vary over time and across different cultures and, as a result, there are no features that are common to all women (or to all men). There is also variation within a single culture due to the intersection of gender with other social identities, like race, or class (Spelman 1988). So, even within one culture, there is no possibility of a shared feature or features common to all women or to all men that determine kind mem- bership. Those who would advocate gender essentialism understood as kind essentialism mistake what is social and variable for what is natural and fixed. I call this the social construction argument against gender essentialism.
Realism in a second sense, namely that color is a universal, has been thought to accompany realism in the first sense that color is a physical, intrinsic property.
One version of color realism is that the property is an intrinsic property of the things that are colored; it is not, for example, a dispositional (though real) property of bringing about color experiences in human observers.
The history of philosophy shows us that indeed social constructionism does not rule out gender realism (in the second sense). Locke’s “nominal essence” corresponds to a universal that is made up by us.
Mikkola outlines examples of extrinsic and relational properties that—she claims一are candidates to be universals. Consider her discussion of “being a wife”.
The history of philosophy shows us that indeed social constructionism does not rule out gender realism (in the second sense).
Haslanger is introducing a nominal essence, or a social universal, and hence implicitly a realist conception of woman.
So, introducing a definition may help to classify social reality. But the presence of a definition does not by itself imply that the relations in the definition correspond to social relations in the world.
In her 1988 book she claimed that “much of Western feminist theory” is committed to gender realism, a Platonic conception of universal womanness, the position that particular women are “instantiations of a single, non-physical, and unchanging Form”.
我一直受哲学史的影响，认为nominalism是拒绝柏拉图式的理念，所以对于gender nominal是什么很困惑。特意查了Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy。
Nominalism comes in at least two varieties. In one of them it is the rejection of abstract objects; in the other it is the rejection of universals. Philosophers have often found it necessary to postulate either abstract objects or universals. And so Nominalism in one form or another has played a significant role in the metaphysical debate since at least the Middle Ages, when versions of the second variety of Nominalism were introduced. The two varieties of Nominalism are independent from each other and either can be consistently held without the other.
As noted above, the two forms of nominalism are independent. The possibility of being a nominalist in one sense but not in the other has been exemplified in the history of philosophy. For instance, David Armstrong (1978; 1997) is a believer in universals, and so he is not a nominalist in the sense of rejecting universals, but he believes that everything that exists is spatiotemporal, and so he is a nominalist in the sense of rejecting abstract objects. And there are those who, like Quine at a certain point of his philosophical development (1964; 1981), accept sets or classes and so are not nominalists in the sense of rejecting abstract objects and yet reject universals and so are nominalists in the sense of rejecting universals.
But what does Nominalism claim with respect to the entities alleged by some to be universals or abstract objects, e.g. properties, numbers, propositions, possible worlds? Here there are two general options: (a) to deny the existence of the alleged entities in question, and (b) to accept the existence of these entities but to argue that they are particular or concrete.
The word “nominalism” can be used to deny the existence of the social category in question, that is, to deny the existence of race, or gender. I am using “nominalism” in a sense that need not deny the existence of gender categories. “Nominalism” is the rejection of a universal——the rejection of a metaphysical position that posits a universal womanness to explain how the class “woman” is unified.
Resemblance nominalism: “it is not that scarlet things resemble one another because they are scarlet, but what makes them scarlet is that they resemble one another”
This is the problem of the resemblance regress. Suppose that a, b and c are scarlet apples. If so, each one has its own scarlet trope: call them sa, sb, and sc. Since sa, sb, and sc are scarlet tropes, every two of them resemble each other. But then there are three resemblance tropes as well: the resemblance between sa and sb, the resemblance between sa and sc, and the resemblance between sb and sc. But these resemblance tropes, since they are resemblance tropes, resemble each other. So there are ‘second-order’ resemblance tropes: the resemblance between the resemblance between sa and sb and the resemblance between sa and sc, the resemblance between the resemblance between sa and sb and the resemblance between sb and sc, and the resemblance between the resemblance between sa and sc and the resemblance between sb and sc. But these ‘second-order’ resemblance tropes resemble each other. So there are ‘third-order’ resemblance tropes, and so on ad infinitum.