每周阅读材料列表(全)

因为放每周阅读材料的文件夹都会被我填很满,所以在这里整理个列表便于查阅。

注意:这是 Aspasia 在阅读小组时期的帖子。虽然阅读小组的活动业已停止,我们仍将本帖保留了下来。

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(1) Haslanger’s “Gender and Race” (2018年9月)

Haslanger, Sally. 2000. “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” Noûs 34 (1): 31–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00201.

扩展阅读:

  1. Haslanger, Sally. 1999. “What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology.” Philosophical Perspectives 13: 459–80. https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.20.
  2. Haslanger, Sally. 2007. “‘But Mom, Crop-Tops Are Cute!’ Social Knowledge, Social Structure and Ideology Critique.” Philosophical Issues 17 (1): 70–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00123.x.
  3. Haslanger, Sally. 1995. “Ontology and Social Construction.” Philosophical Topics 23 (2): 95–125. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics19952324.
  4. Jenkins, Katharine. 2016. “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman.” Ethics 126 (2): 394–421. https://doi.org/10.1086/683535.
  5. Stoljar, Natalie. 2011. “Different Women. Gender and the Realism-Nominalism Debate.” In Feminist Metaphysics: Explorations in the Ontology of Sex, Gender and the Self, edited by Charlotte Witt, 27–46. Dordrecht: Springer.
  6. Witt, Charlotte. 2011. “Two Notions of Essence.” In her The Metaphysics of Gender, 3–26. New York: Oxford University Press.
  7. Frye, Marilyn. 1983. “Oppression.” In her The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, 1–16. New York: The Crossing Press.
  8. Young, Iris Marion. 1990. “Five Faces of Oppression.” In Justice and the Politics of Difference , 39–65. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
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(2) Mikkola’s “Gender Controversy” (2018年10月)

Mikkola, Mari. 2016. “The Gender Controversy.” In her The Wrong of Injustice: Dehumanization and Its Role in Feminist Philosophy, 21–44. New York: Oxford University Press.

扩展阅读:

  1. Geddes, Patrick, and J. Arthur Thomson. 1889. The Evolution of Sex. London: Walter Scott.
  2. Haslanger, Sally. 1995. “Ontology and Social Construction.” Philosophical Topics 23 (2): 95–125. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics19952324.
  3. Haslanger, Sally. 2017. “The Sex/Gender Distinction and the Social Construction of Reality.” In The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy, edited by Ann Garry, Serene J. Khader, and Alison Stone, 157–67. New York: Routledge.
  4. Ásta Sveinsdóttir. 2015. “Social Construction.” Philosophy Compass 10 (12): 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12265.
  5. Moi, Toril. 1999. “What Is a Woman ? Sex, Gender, and the Body in Feminist Theory.” In her What Is a Woman? And Other Essays, 3–120. New York: Oxford University Press.
  6. Fine, Cordelia. 2014. “His Brain, Her Brain?” Science 346 (6212): 915. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1262061.
  7. Fine, Cordelia, John Dupré, and Daphna Joel. 2017. “Sex-Linked Behavior: Evolution, Stability, and Variability.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 21 (9): 666–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.06.012.
  8. Byne, William, Stuart Tobet, Linda A. Mattiace, Mitchell S. Lasco, Eileen Kemether, Mark A. Edgar, Susan Morgello, Monte S. Buchsbaum, and Liesl B. Jones. 2001. “The Interstitial Nuclei of the Human Anterior Hypothalamus: An Investigation of Variation with Sex, Sexual Orientation, and HIV Status.” Hormones and Behavior 40 (2): 86–92. https://doi.org/10.1006/hbeh.2001.1680.
  9. De Vries, Geert J., Emilie F. Rissman, Richard B. Simerly, Liang-Yo Yang, Elka M. Scordalakes, Catherine J. Auger, Amanda Swain, Robin Lovell-Badge, Paul S. Burgoyne, and Arthur P. Arnold. 2002. “A Model System for Study of Sex Chromosome Effects on Sexually Dimorphic Neural and Behavioral Traits.” The Journal of Neuroscience 22 (20): 9005. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.22-20-09005.2002.
  10. Alexander, Gerianne M. 2003. “An Evolutionary Perspective of Sex-Typed Toy Preferences: Pink, Blue, and the Brain.” Archives of Sexual Behavior 32 (1): 7–14. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021833110722.
  11. Berenbaum, Sheri A., and Melissa Hines. 1992. “Early Androgens Are Related to Childhood Sex-Typed Toy Preferences.” Psychological Science 3 (3): 203–6. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1992.tb00028.x.
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(3) Stoljar’s “Different Women” (2018年10月)

Stoljar, Natalie. 2011. “Different Women. Gender and the Realism-Nominalism Debate.” In Feminist Metaphysics: Explorations in the Ontology of Sex, Gender and the Self, edited by Charlotte Witt, 27–46. Dordrecht: Springer.

扩展阅读:

  1. Stoljar, Natalie. 1995. “Essence, Identity, and the Concept of Woman.” Philosophical Topics 23 (2): 261–93. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics19952328.
  2. Spelman, Elizabeth. 1988. “Woman: The One and the Many.” In her Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought , 133–59. Boston: Beacon Press.
  3. Mikkola, Mari. 2009. “Gender Concepts and Intuitions.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4): 559–83. https://doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0060.
  4. Bach, Theodore. 2012. “Gender Is a Natural Kind with a Historical Essence.” Ethics 122 (2): 231–72. https://doi.org/10.1086/663232.
  5. Locke, John. 1689. Sections III.iii.15–19 from his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
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我们试试每周弄个网盘文件夹?

我们有 google drive……但好像被我疲于更新()

(4) Nussbaum’s “Women and Cultural Universals” (2018年11月)

Nussbaum, Martha C. 1999. “Women and Cultural Universals.” In her Sex and Social Justice, 29–54. New York: Oxford University Press.

扩展阅读:

  1. Nussbaum, Martha C. 1995. “Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings.” In Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, edited by Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, 61–104. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.
  2. Nussbaum’s 2007 note to her 1995 paper, quoted in Global Justice: Seminal Essays (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2008), pp. 536–37.
  3. Wolf, Susan. 1995. “Martha C. Nussbaum: Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings.” In Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, edited by Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, 105–15. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.
  4. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. “In Defense of Universal Values.” In her Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 34–110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  5. Li, Xiaorong. 1995. “Gender Inequality in China and Cultural Relativism.” In Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, edited by Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, 407–25. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.
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所以下载的话还是要回到群里?

嗯……暂时是只放在群文件里。

@Harukaze @liuyimao5 我们以后要把文件传到论坛上吗?不过我稍微有点版权的问题…

Private Google drive 或者群文件吧。版权是问题

我们算是fair use吧。百度网盘怎样?

半公开的分享有点踩线吧

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(5) Díaz-León’s “Woman as a Politically Significant Term” (2018年12月)

Díaz-León, Esa. 2016. “Woman as a Politically Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle.” Hypatia 31 (2): 245–58.

扩展阅读:

  1. Haslanger, Sally. 2000. “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” Noûs 34 (1): 31–55. http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/papers/WIGRnous.pdf
  2. Jenkins, Katharine. 2016. “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman.” Ethics 126 (2): 394–421. https://doi.org/10.1086/683535.
  3. Stoljar, Natalie. 2011. “Different Women. Gender and the Realism-Nominalism Debate.” In Feminist Metaphysics: Explorations in the Ontology of Sex, Gender and the Self, edited by Charlotte Witt, 27–46. Dordrecht: Springer.
  4. Burgess, Alexis and David Plunkett. 2013. “Conceptual Ethics I.” Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091–101.
  5. 4.Burgess, Alexis and David Plunkett. 2013. “Conceptual Ethics II.” Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1102–10.
  6. Schroeter, Laura and François Schroeter. 2015. “Rationalizing Self-Interpretation.” In The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, edited by Chris Daly, 419–47.
  7. Dembrof, Robin A. 2016. “What Is Sexual Orientation?”. Philosophers’ Imprint 16 (3). https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/3521354.0016.003/1
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