When pursued naturalistically, metaphysics may seem forced to navigate a narrow path. So that it may be a worthwhile enterprise, it must have claim to discovery of a distinctive set of objective truths. Yet it must also avoid potential competition or conflict with the results of scientific theories. In response to this problem, some naturalistic metaphysicians have argued that properly understood, metaphysics is aimed at a set of truths distinct from those of science. Metaphysicians investigate a realm of truths more fundamental than those of even fundamental science. This paper examines what is required both in science and metaphysics for a theory to count as a fundamental theory. Several criteria are presented which suggest that metaphysics does not investigate a realm more fundamental than that of science.
看到这个让我想起我最近和学生聊起的一个话题：
我读硕士的时候读过一篇文章，谁写的写啥的我都忘了，就记得其中有一句话，大概是we must settle our metaphysics before we deal with epistemology。我当时看了就觉得特别惊讶，因为我一直觉得我们当然应该先settle epistemology然后再聊metaphysics，不然我们咋知道metaphysics是什么样的。
我就跟当时的一个同学表达了这个惊讶，他则对我的惊讶表示了惊讶。他说他和这个作者一样一直认为需要先做好metaphysics然后才能做epistemology。
后来这个同学做了metaphysics，我做了phil of science。所以我一直以为metaphysics-oriented philosophers都去做了metaphysics然后epistemology-oriented philosophers都做了phil of science。
但后来在phil science也遇到了一些metaphysics-oriented的人，让我打消了这个念头。
但是，anyway，我觉得比起问一个哲学家是更rationalist还是更empiricist，这个区别更substantive
可能还有第三种观点，就是并不是说一定要 settle Metaphysics or Epistemology 才能进行另外一个。 这两个的关系就好像 Biology 和 Philosophy of biology. 你并不需要 settle 所有的 philosophy of biology (Epistemology) 才能做出来好的 Biology 的研究(Metaphysics).
Exactly what one should say about empiricism and metaphysics is a deep philosophical question in its own right, and it’s unlikely that anyone will decisively answer it anytime soon. But that shouldn’t, on its own, deter you from thinking about metaphysics. Philosophy is the one discipline in which questions about the value of that discipline are central questions within that very discipline. The philosopher must therefore live with uncertainty about whether her life’s work is ultimately meaningful—that is the cost of the breadth of reflection demanded by philosophy. Philosophy’s reflective nature is generally a good thing, but the down side is that it can lead to paralysis. Don’t let it. You don’t need to have answers to all meta-questions before you can ask first-order questions (just as you don’t need to sort out the philosophy of biology before doing good work in biology.) The meta-questions are certainly important. But the history of philosophy is full of sweeping theories saying that this or that bit of philosophy is impossible. Take heart in the knowledge that these have all failed miserably.
–Ted Sider (2007), “Introduction”, in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics.
